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Abstract: Applying the theory of yardstick competition to the schooling system, we show 
that it is optimal to have central tests of student achievement and to engage in benchmarking 
because it raises the quality of teaching. This is true even if teachers’ pay (defined in 
monetary terms) is not performance related. If teachers value reputation, and if teaching 
output is measured so that it becomes comparable, teachers will increase their effort. The 
theory is tested using the German PISA-E data. Use is made of the fact that central exams 
exist in some federal states of Germany but not in all. The empirical evidence suggests that 
central exams have a positive effect on the quality of teaching. 
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Until recent years, the idea of reforming the school system has been virtually unheard 
of in Germany. However, that has changed dramatically after the results of two recent 
international studies on student achievement – TIMSS (Third International Mathematics and 
Science Study) and PISA (OECD Programme for International Student Assessment) – have 
gained the attention of a broader public and initiated intense political discussions about the 
need to reform the German school system. Part of the discussion has focused on too little 
financial resources flowing into the school system. However, from an economists' point of 
view, changing the institutional setup of the school system appears to be a more cost efficient 
approach. Although the short-term costs of changing the environment in which students, 
teachers, and schools act can be high, it is unlikely that new rules cost much once they are 
firmly established. One change in the institutional setup as a reaction to PISA has already 
been implemented: standardized tests will be more widely adopted in Germany in the future. 
In the present paper we look at whether and under what conditions standardized tests can 
create incentives for teachers to deliver higher quality teaching. 
Teacher quality is often viewed as one of the most important inputs in an education 
production function. Hence, there is a broad consensus that academic achievement of students 
can be raised if the quality of teachers improves. Teacher quality has several dimensions: 
formal qualifications, teaching experience, the quality of teacher education itself, or the 
teaching effort made by teachers given their formal qualification.
1 There are several routes for 
education policy to improve the quality of school teachers. In this paper we concentrate on the 
effort of teachers and the way politics is challenged to improve the incentives for teachers to 
perform better.  
One way to create incentives for teachers is performance related pay. However, the 
empirical evidence on the relationship between teacher salaries and teacher quality is 
surprisingly mixed. For example, Lavy (2002, 2004) evaluates a rank-order tournament in 
Israel. The results suggest positive incentive effects of both performance related salaries and 
performance related resources given to schools. Moreover, monetary incentives in form of 
teacher salaries are found to be more cost effective than awarding more resources to the 
teacher’s school. Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin (2004), using data on Texas elementary schools, 
show that teacher salaries and teacher supply are only weakly related. The composition of 
teachers within a school district appears to be more affected by characteristics of students than 
by salary schedules. Apart from tying teacher’s pay to the quality of teaching, higher quality 
                                                 
1 For a survey of the literature see Hanushek and Rivkin (2004). 
  1could be enforced by stricter certification and licensing provisions. Angrist and Guryan 
(2003) argue that this strategy can fail: the introduction of state-mandated teacher testing in 
the US has increased teacher wages with no corresponding increase in quality. 
Strengthening non-monetary incentives in the schooling system is yet another 
alternative. This could be simply done by setting common standards, testing students against 
this standard, and finally making the results public. Teachers will then be motivated to 
perform well in order to gain non-monetary rewards like reputation or acceptance among 
colleagues, parents, and students. 
In Section 2, we show in a theoretical model that it is optimal to let a teacher’s reward 
(with monetary and non-monetary components) depend on the absolute and relative 
performance of the teacher’s class. To measure performance as an indicator of teacher quality, 
common standards are needed and students have to be tested against these standards. 
Measuring the performance of a teacher’s class raises the effort put forth by teachers and 
hence also the academic performance of the students. It is argued that controlling for the 
socio-economic background of the school or the students can reap additional efficiency 
gains.
2 An intelligent benchmarking yields the maximal efficiency gains. In the present paper, 
we use data from the German PISA-E study (PISA-extension) to estimate the effects of 
external standards on teacher quality. Two types of variables are used to measure teacher 
quality. First, we use subjective measures of teacher and school quality from the student and 
parents questionnaires. Second, we analyze student performance as measured by the PISA test 
score to estimate the effect of external standards on achievement. 
Estimating the effects of central exams is not straightforward, because it is typically 
decided on the country level whether to have or not to have central exams. Thus within a 
country there is hardly any variation in exam types which makes it difficult to estimate the 
effects of central standards using national data
3. Germany is an exception because, due to its 
federal structure, there has been a long-standing tradition of testing against external standards 
at the end of secondary schooling in some federal states and of having no standardized tests in 
                                                 
2 Benchmarking in the school system is already practiced, for instance in the US state of California. 
Public schools are evaluated based on a so-called Academic Performance Index (API). Each school has to meet a 
target and is either rewarded for achieving the target or sanctioned for failing to reach the target. Schools are 
ranked according to their API value. They are ranked within schools of their type, but also, and this picks up the 
idea of benchmarking, schools are compared to 100 other schools that are similar with respect to demographic 
characteristics (Similar Schools Rank). 
 
3Using international data, the effects could theoretically be estimated (Bishop 1997, 1999; Wößmann 2002) but 
the drawbacks are manifold (Jürges and Schneider, 2004; Jürges, Schneider and Büchel, 2003). Another example 
of a country with a federal structure and central exams in some but not all provinces is Canada. Bishop (1997, 
1999) exploits the Canadian data. 
  2others.
4 Moreover, the federal states differ with respect to the practice of publishing the data 
from standardized tests. Saxony, for example publishes the results from the central exit exams 
on the school’s home page together with information about the endowment and profile of the 
school. In other states the data is published on a more aggregated level and more detailed 
results are primarily reported back to the school. In most states with standardized tests poor 
performance of schools causes the supervisory school authority to search for the cause of 
problem. Hence the German schooling system in its federal diversity is suitable to test for the 
effects of external standards on teacher quality measures and indirect measures like test scores 
in international tests. 
Jürges, Schneider and Büchel (2005) use data from TIMSS-Germany and estimate the 
effect of central exit exams (CEE) on test scores in Germany with a difference-in-difference 
estimator. The estimate is positive and significant but smaller than previous studies had 
suggested. While Jürges et al. (2005) estimate the effect to be at least one third of a school 
year equivalent using German data only, Wößmann (2002) uses the international TIMSS 
micro data and estimates the effect to be as much as about one school year equivalent. Here 
we present a complementary approach to estimate the effect of central standards, focusing on 
the quality of teachers. We use data from the PISA-E study to show that teachers' 
performance is in fact better when standards are enforced through central exit exams. In order 
to estimate the CEE effects, students in CEE-states and non-CEE states are matched on the 
basis of the propensity score. The results support the predictions from the theoretical model. 
Teacher quality is higher in states with CEEs. 
The paper proceeds as follows: The theoretical argument is developed in Section 2. 
Section 3 describes the data. In Section 4 we discuss the empirical model and the results, and 
in Section 5 we briefly summarize the main findings and conclude. 
 
2. The Model 
The theoretical literature almost unanimously argues that CEEs and hence central 
standards improve student performance and might even raise welfare (Costrell, 1997, Effinger 
and Polborn, 1999). Central exit examinations are purported to function better as incentives 
for students, teachers and schools than decentralized examinations (e.g. Bishop, 1997, 1999). 
Students, for example, benefit because the results of CEEs are more valuable as signals on the 
                                                 
4 However, as a result of the unsatisfactory performance of German students in international student achievement 
studies like PISA or TIMSS, standardized tests will be adopted in almost all of the remaining federal states in the 
near future. 
  3job market than the results of non-central examinations, simply because the former are better 
comparable. Furthermore, students who have to meet an external standard at the end of their 
school career have no incentive to establish a low-achievement cartel in class, possibly with 
the tacit consent of the teachers. Student test results can be used to monitor teacher and 
teaching quality on a regular basis. Whether incentives to improve teaching quality, arguably 
an important factor in the education production function, should come solely from reputation 
effects on the teacher or school level, or in form of higher pay for better teachers is open to 
discussion (Hanushek et al., 1999; Lavy, 2002, 2004; Glewwe, Ilias and Kremer, 2003). 
The following model focuses on the incentives for teachers and describes how teachers 
determine effort and how a social planner chooses the components of the teacher’s reward to 
maximize a social welfare function. The basic idea is that the planner is interested in setting 
the right incentives for teachers to put forth effort, which is unobservable. The outcome of 
teaching, the academic achievement of students, reflects effort to some degree, but 
achievement is an imperfect measure of effort when classes are not homogenous with respect 
to their average ability. With heterogeneous classes the planner does not know for sure how 
much effort the teacher has invested. The literature on yardstick competition shows how a 
first-best level of welfare can be obtained by competing away the asymmetry of information 
(Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers, 1994). The following model is an application of yardstick 
competition to the schooling system. 
First consider the teachers decision on teaching effort. Each teacher is allocated to one 
class i. The index i thus uniquely identifies teachers and their classes. The average ability of 
students in class i is  i θ
~
 (the tilde denotes stochastic variables). Average ability of the students 
differs between classes, but we assume that there is no sorting of students by ability and that 
the average ability of the class is only known to the teacher but not to the planner. Let θ
~
 be 
the benchmark for  i θ
~
. The benchmark θ
~
 could be the average ability of a set of classes 
against which  i θ
~
 is compared. Since average ability is stochastic and students are not sorted 
by ability we get  θ
~









cov( σ θ θ r i = , and r>0. The positive 
covariance between the ability of students in class i and the benchmark ensures that there is 
no systematic sorting of teachers and students. Thus low ability students cannot always be an 
excuse for the poor performance of teachers’ classes. This relationship is crucial for the 
argument. Only if the ability of students in a class and its benchmark are positively related, it 
is meaningful to compare academic achievement and to condition the teacher’s reward on the 
relative academic achievement of the students. 
  4Student achievement,  i a ~  (as measured in e.g. central exams or standardized tests like 
PISA) depends on the ability of the students and teacher’s effort,  . In particular we choose 
an additive structure 
i e
  i i i e
~
a ~ + =θ . 
The achievement of the benchmark is denoted by  e a ~ ~ ~ + =θ . 
The teacher’s reward, Wi
~
, consists of a basic salary and a bonus that depends on the 
performance of the own class and also on the performance of the benchmark 
  a a W a a W i i i
~ ~ ) , (
~
δ α − + = , with  0 , ≥ δ α . 
Note that the bonus does not have to be a monetary bonus but could be reputation or 
recognition by students, parents or colleagues. Being in a school with a high reputation can be 
quite valuable for a teacher. Similarly, being assessed as a (relatively) bad teacher can cause 
disutility and might set strong incentives to improve by working harder. We choose the 
interpretation of  a ai
~ ~ δ α −  as non-monetary components of the teacher reward to apply the 
model to the German schooling system. Teacher’s pay in Germany is basically not related to 
performance but rises with the age of the teacher. Thus, the career profile of a German teacher 
is fairly flat. Nevertheless, some federal states decided to make the quality of teaching visible 
and hence comparable by testing students centrally, thereby allowing the reputation of a 
teacher to depend directly on the quality of the output: student achievement. 
The parameters α and δ are policy parameters in this model. If they assume strictly 
positive values, the teacher’s reward depends on the absolute and relative performance of her 
class. If only α  is positive, the reward depends on the performance of the own class only, but 
it is not feasible to compare the performance of the teacher’s own class to the performance of 
the benchmark. Positive values of δ  indicate that recognition depends also on the 
performance of the benchmark. Put differently, if my class performs well, I gain recognition. 
However, if the benchmark performs well, my results are worth less than if the benchmark 
performs poorly. If α and δ are both zero, teachers receive a basic, performance independent 
salary only. This is the case if performance is not measured and no benchmark exists against 
which to compare the achievement of the teacher or the students, respectively. Benchmarking 
requires a common standard for measuring achievement, which is enforced by means of 
central exams. 
  5In the following we show that a social planner would optimally choose positive values 
for both parameters, α and δ. The choice of some positive α is a direct means to elicit 
teacher’s effort. The choice of a positive value for δ is less obvious and needs to be proven. 
As we will show, δ is smaller than α in the optimum. However, it is larger the stronger the 
correlation of the average ability  i θ
~
 and the benchmark θ
~
. Thus benchmarking is socially 
desirable only to the extent to which comparability of abilities is given. 
Teachers derive utility from the expected reward, but utility also depends negatively 
on the work effort. Reward and effort have to be traded off. Moreover, if teachers are risk 
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Since the variance does not depend on the effort e , teachers determine optimal effort by 
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The social planner decides on the policy parameters, i.e. the structure of the teacher 
reward. In decentralized systems, the social planner could be the principal of the school, in 
centralized systems it could be the ministry of education. The social planner maximizes a 
welfare function of the type 
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, i.e., the social planner is interested in the academic performance 
of the students but wants to keep the rewards low. Assuming additivity yields 
  [ ]. ) ( )
~
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The planner maximizes the welfare function by determining the optimal structure of teachers’ 
reward, respecting the participation constraint. Thus she 
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Partial differentiation with respect to W  yields  1 = λ . 
Using  1 = λ  in (2) gives 
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Differentiating (3) with respect to δ  yields 
  α δ r = , (4) 
and finally from the first-order condition with respect to α  we get 
 
) 1 ( 1
1
2 2 r − +
=
γσ
α . (5) 
 
Note that  0 > α , whereas  0 > δ  only if   Hence it is always optimal to reward 
teachers according to the absolute performance of the class. However, it is only optimal to 
reward teachers also according to relative academic achievement if comparability can be 
ensured. The better the comparability as measured by a large value of r, the better the 
benchmark. In case of perfect correlation, r=1, the first best, 1 , is obtained. This 
raises the issue on how to choose the benchmark against which to compare the achievement 
of class i. Clearly, if 
. 0 > r
*
i e = = = α δ
θ
~
 is the average ability of all students in the country, θ
~
is non-
stochastic and r vanishes. As a result  0 = δ . The interpretation is that there is less gain in 
social welfare from benchmarking when comparability cannot be ensured. But even if r<1, it 
still pays to reward teachers according to absolute academic achievement, although the first 
best is not achieved. The reason is that teachers are assumed to be risk averse, and the social 
planner has to account for this as the structure of the teacher reward affects the participation 
constraint. The more risk averse teachers are, or the larger the variance of students’ average 
ability, the more costly it is to reward teachers according to student achievement. 
To summarize the main results of the theoretical model: We have demonstrated that it  
is efficiency enhancing to let teachers’ reward depend on absolute and relative performance 
measures based on the academic achievement of students. The requirement for this is a 
standardized evaluation of student achievement in form of centralized high-stakes testing, 
  7e.g., a central exam. Thus we expect the quality of teachers to be higher and the performance 
of students to be better when achievement is measured and published. Moreover, efficiency 
gains can be realized if the performance of classes as an indicator of teacher quality is 
evaluated relative to a good benchmark. This can be achieved by controlling for observables 
like the socio-economic background of students. In the following empirical part of the paper, 
we apply the model to the German schooling system and use the institutional variation to test 
whether teacher quality is in fact higher with central exams. 
 
3. The practice of CEEs in Germany and the German PISA-E data 
The data used in the empirical analysis are drawn from the German PISA 2000 
extension study (PISA-E)
5. The OECD-Programme for International Student Assessment – 
PISA – aims to assess the knowledge and skills of students approaching the end of 
compulsory schooling in the basic fields of reading, mathematics, and science.
6 A total of 32 
countries participated in the first assessment in 2000 with the focus of the testing being on the 
reading literacy of 15 year olds students. In 2003 the major domain was mathematical literacy 
and in 2006 the focus will be scientific literacy. Students are not only tested in the respective 
fields, but they are also asked to complete a detailed questionnaire on their teachers and 
schools and on their general background. The data are augmented by "home questionnaires", 
to be completed by parents and "school questionnaires", completed by school principals. In 
each country tested between 4,500 and 10,000 students. In Germany, 5,000 students from 219 
schools participated in the first PISA test. 
Germany complemented PISA 2000 by a national extension, called PISA-E, which 
was conducted simultaneously with the PISA test. About 40,000 students from 1,300 schools 
participated in PISA and PISA-E combined. Students eligible for the test were drawn in a 
two-stage probability sample design. Within each federal state and school type, 25 schools 
were drawn with sampling probability proportional to school size.
7 Within each school, two 
samples were drawn. The first was a sample of 15 year olds (target n = 25), independent of 
the grade. This was the main sample, with the same eligibility criteria as the international 
                                                 
5 The data are available freely on the website of the German Kultusministerkonferenz (Ministries of education of 
the federal states; http://www.kmk.org/). 
6 One argument against central (high-stakes) tests is the possibility of teaching-to-the-test (for a discussion see 
e.g. Lazear, 2004). Our data, however, stems from the PISA-study and not from exams based on a national 
curriculum. Thus teachers in Germany were not familiar with the test content, and, if teaching-to-the-test is a 
relevant problem, it should not affect the PISA results. Another difference between low- and high-stakes testing 
is student motivation. It is presumably higher in high-stakes so that low-stakes test results might be a downward-
biased estimate of the true student ability. 
7 In Thuringia and Saxony, 75 middle schools were sampled. 
  8PISA study. The second was a supplementary sample of 9
th graders who are not 15 years old 
(target n = 10).
8 In the present study, we work with the main sample of 15 year olds only, for 
two important reasons. First, only in this sample we are able to identify schools as the primary 
sampling units, i.e. only in this sample we are able to tell which students belong to the same 
school. This is important for the computation of correct standard errors. Second, only in this 
sample we have available test results that are comparable across federal states.
9 Although the 
data include information on all 16 German federal states and all school types, we further 
restricted our sample by excluding all students from Berlin and Hamburg as well as all 
students from comprehensive schools (Gesamtschule, see below). In each case, non-
participation rates are considered as too high to yield reliable results (Baumert et al. 2002). 
Before we discuss the practice of CEEs in Germany, we briefly describe the German 
school system in Figure 1
10. All children in Germany attend primary school, which covers 
grades 1 to 4, or in some states grades 1 to 6. There is no formal exit examination at the end 
of primary schooling. Rather, students are generally allocated to one of the three secondary 
school types on the basis of the primary school’s recommendation. If the primary school's 
recommendation conflicts with the parents' wishes, however, the final decision about the 
future course of education lies either with the parents, the secondary school, or the school 
supervisory authority, depending on the federal state. Thus it is the idea of the German 
schooling system to sort students according to ability. Note that it follows from the theoretical 
model that comparison of student achievement across school types is undesirable but that a 
comparison of teachers within a school type is preferable on efficiency grounds. 
  <about here Figure 1> 
The Hauptschule, Realschule and Gymnasium are the three main types of secondary 
school; each leads to a specific leaving certificate. The Hauptschule provides its students with 
basic general education, and usually comprises grades 5 to 9 (or 10 in some states). The 
Realschule provides a more extensive general education, usually comprising grades 5 to 10. 
The  Gymnasium  provides an in-depth general education covering both lower and upper 
secondary level, and usually comprises grades 5 to 13 (or 12 in states in eastern Germany). 
Depending on their academic performance, students can switch between school types. A 
fourth type of school is the Gesamtschule (comprehensive school). This type of secondary 
school offers all lower secondary level leaving certificates, as well as providing upper 
                                                 
8 For a detailed description of PISA-E and its sample design see Baumert et al. (2002). 
9 In the sample of 9
th graders it is not possible to identify 15 year olds and non-15 year olds belonging in the 
same school. Moreover, the data release only contains test results that have been standardized by federal state. 
10 A detailed description of the German school system can be found in Jonen and Boene (2001). 
  9secondary education. It only plays a minor role in most federal states with less than 10 percent 
of all students attending a comprehensive school. 
As mentioned at the outset, decisions concerning the institutional settings of the 
schooling systems are largely determined on the level of the federal states in Germany. One 
prominent example of state-specific institutions is the existence of external standards in form 
of central exit exams (CEE) that allow to compare the quality of teachers by comparing test 
results, i.e. the academic achievement of the students. 
Central exit examinations are most common at the end of upper-secondary education 
(see Table 1). In 2000, seven out of the sixteen German federal states had a central Abitur 
(high-school diploma) at the state level. These states are concentrated in the south (Baden-
Württemberg, Bavaria, Saarland) and east (Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, 
Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia). The other states had decentralized systems, where teachers design 
problems for exit examinations individually subject to the approval of the school supervisory 
authority. Six states had central exit examinations at the end of Realschule and only four had 
them at the end of Hauptschule. Note that different CEEs are designed for different school 
types within a federal state, such that comparisons of exam results across school types are not 
possible. According to our theoretical argument made in the previous section such 
comparisons are neither needed nor wanted to achieve efficiency.  
  <about here Table 1> 
This institutional variation found in Germany allows to test empirically  for the effects 
of central exit exams on the quality of teachers. However, estimating the effect of CEE is not 
straightforward for various reasons. Teachers’ effort or the quality of teaching is 
unobservable. PISA-E contains a large set of items that can be used to construct indices of 
teaching quality, which are not necessarily unrelated. Students evaluated their classes and 
teachers with respect to several dimensions such as achievement pressure, teacher support, 
disciplinary climate, clarity of instruction, excessive demands, and teachers' individual 
orientation. Parents were asked to evaluate teachers' demands and efforts, and their overall 
satisfaction with the school. In addition to these subjective indicators we also use student test 
results in PISA-E as a more objective indicator of teacher effort. Unlike in TIMSS, teachers 
were not interviewed in PISA-E, so that we have no self-assessed measures of teacher effort. 
  <about here Table 2> 
The qualitative teacher variables derived from the students' reports are listed in Table 
2. Here, we only mention the number of items used to construct the indices and their 
  10reliability (measured by Cronbach's α). Overall, the reliability of the indices is at acceptable 
to good levels. A detailed list of all items can be found in the Appendix. Here, we only give a 
short description: 
•  Achievement pressure measures the frequency with which teachers tell their students to 
work harder. 
•  Teacher support measures the frequency with which teachers help students when they 
have problems of understanding. 
•  Bad disciplinary climate measures the frequency with which bad discipline among 
students undermines teaching. 
•  Clarity of instruction measures the frequency with which lessons and exercises are clearly 
structured. 
•  Excess demand measures the frequency with which students think that teachers ask too 
much of them. 
•  Individual orientation measures the frequency with which teachers commend below-
average students who make progress. 
Students were asked to evaluate teachers in both mathematics and German classes. For 
mathematics classes, we have two additional indicators, the frequency of repetitive exercises 
and the frequency of innovative exercises (i.e. exercises that require to apply skills in 
changing contexts). Parents' evaluations are measured by answers to single questions on 
academic level, teachers' effort and overall satisfaction with the school. 
Besides the subjective judgements of students and parents we use PISA-E test results 
as more objective indicators of teacher effort. Note however that, since central exams create 
incentives for both teachers and students (Jürges et al. 2005), test score differences do not 
identify the pure effect of CEEs on teacher effort but the combined incentive effect on 
teachers and students. PISA-E does not contain a single test score for each student but five so-
called plausible values (Mislevy 1991). This method, closely related to multiple imputation, 
has been developed for large-scale low-stakes testing such as PISA (originally developed for 
the US National Assessments of Educational Progress (NAEP), see e.g. Allen, Donoghue & 
Schoeps (2001)). Because PISA aims at testing broad areas of proficiency in limited testing 
time, it is not possible to give each student enough items to obtain a precise estimate of their 
proficiency in each area. Instead, students are given a curtailed set of items (test books), so 
that test results are not directly comparable across students with different test books. The 
solution to this problem is to compute plausible values. Loosely speaking, these are informed 
  11guesses about the test score a student would achieve if he or she was tested on all items and 
took the test seriously. Each single plausible value is an unbiased estimate of student ability. 
All results reported below are based on all five plausible values, with differences being 
averaged across regressions including different plausible values and standard errors computed 
as the square root of the sum of average within and between regression variances (Mislevy 
1991). 
 
  <about here Table 3> 
Table 3 summarizes raw differences in student and parent-assessed teacher effort and 
student achievement between states with and without central exams (states are classified 
according to Table 1 throughout the empirical part of the paper). We have standardized all 
multi-item scales to mean zero and variance one, so that differences can be interpreted in 
terms of standard errors. The parents’ variables are dichotomised and indicate whether parents 
think that the academic level is too low or far too low, whether they think that teachers exert 
themselves not at all or only a little bit for their students, and whether parents are dissatisfied 
or very dissatisfied with the school of their children. 
Note also that we report separate results for the three school types Hauptschule, 
Realschule, and Gymnasium. Students in Haupt- and Realschule take central exams at the end 
of lower secondary schooling, i.e., at the end of grade 9 or 10. We thus expect stronger effects 
of CEEs in these types of schools than in Gymnasium, where the central exams are still three 
to four years in the future. 
Interestingly, there are only two variables that are significantly different between CEE 
and non-CEE states in all three school types: mathematics performance and the parents’ 
assessment of the school’s academic level. Students in CEE-states have higher test scores in 
mathematics, and the difference is largest in Hauptschule. CEEs could thus be interpreted as 
particularly beneficial for weaker students who are typically allocated to this type of school. 
Although the similar pattern for reading performance seems to substantiate this interpretation, 
there are two reasons why it might be wrong. First, the share of students attending 
Hauptschule is typically higher in CEE states, i.e. the student population differs 
systematically between both states. Since students in Hauptschule represent the bottom of the 
ability distribution, the average ability of students will be systematically higher the larger the 
proportion of students in this type of school. Second, the raw difference in test scores is most 
likely not an unbiased estimate of the causal effect of external standards. Both issues will be 
  12taken up in the remainder of the paper, when we control for observed differences using a 
propensity score approach. 
The range of score differences in mathematics is from .129 to .379 standard 
deviations. These differences are somewhat smaller than those found in Jürges et al. (2005) 
for the German TIMSS middle school sample, where the raw difference in mathematics 
scores was .433 standard deviations (Hauptschule and Realschule combined). 
The fact that a larger proportion of parents in non-CEE states than in CEE-states 
consider the academic level of their children’s schools as too low is interesting. If schools in 
CEE-states were "better" only because parents in CEE-states had on average stronger 
preferences for better education, one would not expect such a difference. In a sense, schools 
in CEE-states are thus "overshooting" in relative terms, or rather, schools in non-CEE states 
are "undershooting". This could mean that differences between both regimes not only reflect 
differences in tastes for education. 
Although none of our direct teacher quality indicators is statistically significantly 
different between CEE and non-CEE states across all  school types, there are several 
systematic patterns. Teachers in CEE states exert more pressure on their students to perform 
well, they create a more disciplined climate in class (in particular in Hauptschule), and 
exercises are less repetitive and have more variety. In Gymnasium, teachers in CEE states are 
less supportive when students have trouble understanding and students think more often that 
demands are excessive. When their children are in Realschule or Gymasium, parents in CEE 
states have a more favorable view of their children's schools. They think less often that 
teachers exert too little effort and they are less often dissatisfied with the school as a whole.  
All differences discussed so far are raw differences between schools with and without 
CEEs. The socio-economic background of the students varies across states and school types. 
Below, we will control for these variations. Table 4 describes background variables by CEE 
status and school type. The table neatly shows how students from different backgrounds are 
sorted into school types. Consider parental education, which we measure as the highest degree 
obtained by either parent. The proportion of parents with a high education level (i.e. with a 
college degree) is about 50 percent in Gymnasium but less than 10 percent in Hauptschule. 
Differences between CEE and non-CEE states are rather small, except in Hauptschule, where 
we find about 10 percent more parents with medium education (i.e. who finished upper 
secondary school) at the expense of low education. Other indicators, like the number of books 
at home, whether there is classic literature at home, or whether parents have read to the child 
before it was able to read by itself are often found to be better indicators of student 
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but only small differences across states. Family structure, measured by the percentage of 
children living with single parents, is rather uniform across states and school types. 
Household wealth, coarsely measured by number of cars per adult in the student's household, 
shows the expected variation across school types but only little variation across states. Thus 
the heterogeneity with respect to the students’ background which would make it - according 
to the theoretical model - more problematic to assess teacher quality based on student 
performance, is in fact significantly reduced by allowing comparisons only within a school 
type.  
The main difference between CEE and non-CEE states is the proportion of students 
with a migration background, here measured by the language spoken at home. In Realschule 
and Gymnasium, the proportion of students who don't speak German at home is only half as 
large in CEE than in non-CEE states. One reason for these differences is that CEEs are more 
common in the East than in the West, a heritage of the former GDR's school system, while at 
the same time the proportion of migrants is much lower. More than one half of all Realschule 
students with CEE are from East Germany, whereas less than 10 percent of those without 
CEEs are from the East. 
  <about here Table 4> 
 
4. Estimation and results 
In the following we estimate the effect of external standards on teacher quality. Using 
German PISA data, the most basic approach to identify the effect of CEE on student 
achievement would seem to estimate simple differences between average achievement in CEE 
states and non-CEE states, controlling for student background and other variables of interest. 
Simple differences, however, have only limited value because they ignore a potentially 
confounding effect: the endogeneity of CEEs because of self-selection. 
Although it cannot be ruled out completely that parents vote with their feet and move 
between federal states in order to send their children to schools with or without a central exit 
examination, this seems to be rather unlikely. We therefore assume that the treatment status is 
exogenous given the institutional arrangement in each federal state. However, in the long run 
institutions can change. The existence of CEEs might reflect unobserved variables such as the 
electorate's preferences for education, i.e. parental attitudes towards education and 
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between CEE and non-CEE states are a biased measure of the CEE effect. 
The attempt to estimate the effect of CEE is subject to the fundamental problem of 
causal inference, namely that it is impossible to observe the individual treatment effect 
(Holland, 1986). One cannot observe the same student at the same time as being student in a 
state with and without CEE. In the present paper, we estimate the effect of CEEs using an 
econometric matching estimator. Matching estimators have recently gained much attention in 
the labor market literature, in particular in the context of program evaluation (for overviews 
see e.g. Heckman et al. (1998) or Blundell and Costa Dias (2000)). They provide an 
alternative to instrumental variables when there are no good or convincing instruments. 
However, every attempt to identify causal effects must make use of generally untestable 
assumptions. In the case of matching estimators the assumption is that the selection into a 
treatment is completely determined by observable variables and that given the observable 
variables the selection into the treatment is random (unconfoundedness assumption). Provided 
that the unconfoundedness assumption holds, we can interpret the assignment of students into 
CEE and non-CEE states as a randomized experiment (given all observed characteristics), 
which in turn enables us to interpret our estimates as causal effects of external standards. If 
the unconfoundedness assumption does not hold, we still estimate correlations conditional on 
background characteristics. The simplest form of matching proceeds as follows: For each 
combination of student characteristics compare the quality of teachers in non-CEE states (the 
controls). Then compute some average difference with respect to the joint distribution of 
student characteristics. Of course, the larger the number of variables and the larger the 
number of possible values, the higher the probability of not having a non-CEE student to 
compare to a CEE student or vice versa. One solution to this dimensionality problem is to 
condition the comparison on the propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), which is 
just the conditional probability of receiving the treatment given the pre-treatment variables. 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that when the selection into treatment is random given 
the observables, it is also unconfounded given the propensity score. It is thus possible to 
compute treatment effects conditional on a one-dimensional index. 
Still, when the variables are of high dimensionality, it is often not possible to find 
members of the treatment group and of the control group with exactly the same propensity 
score. In order to make propensity score matching feasible, we apply nearest neighbor 
matching, i.e. each treated individual is matched with the non-treated individual with the 
"nearest" propensity score. 
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The variables used to calculate the propensity score are the same covariates as 
described in Table 4. We compute the propensity score as the linear prediction of a probit 
regression of being subject to a CEE on these covariates. In order to show that the matching 
procedure has indeed produced a balanced sample of treated (CEE) and control (non-CEE) 
students, we calculate the means of all covariates in the matched sample and test whether 
these are different (see Table 5). First, note that the control group in each school type consists 
of relatively few different non-CEE students. For instance, in Hauptschule, each of these 
students contributes 1,374/699 ≈ 1.97 observations to the control group. The corresponding 
number in Realschule and Gymnasium are 4.0 and 2.37, respectively. t-values in Table 5 
account for this fact. Overall, the matching procedure was successful in creating a balanced 
sample. The only notable difference between treatment and control group seems to be the 
proportion of children with 51-100 books at home in the Hauptschule sample. However, a test 
that the overall distribution of the number of books is equal across groups does not reject the 
null hypothesis. We believe that our choice of educational background variables captures 
heterogeneity with respect to tastes for education in CEE and non-CEE states to a very large 
extent. Of course, since we are lacking school or teacher data, we cannot totally exclude the 
possibility that there is still some unobserved heterogeneity left, i.e., unmeasured differences 
between CEE and non-CEE states that might account for any differences observed after 
matching. In that case, our estimated would have to be interpreted as conditional correlations. 
The matching estimates are displayed in Table 6. The most stable results are similar to 
those already discussed in the context of the raw differences: First, students in CEE states 
show significantly better test results than those in non-CEE states. Interestingly, the CEE 
effect estimated here is often larger than the raw difference. We conclude that students in 
CEE states perform better because of external standards that are enforced by central exit 
exams. The results confirm earlier studies by Jürges et al. (2005) and Wößmann (2002). 
Second, the estimated effect is largest in Hauptschule and smallest in Gymnasium, which is 
plausible considering the students' different time horizon. Students in Haupt- and Realschule 
will pass their exam within a shorter period than those in Gymnasium, so our result is 
consistent with the idea that the effect of central exams is stronger when the exams are in the 
near future. Third, we consider the size of the estimated CEE effect. Size effects are usually 
reported in terms of school year equivalents. Although this would be possible in principle (we 
have data on three different grades), it is not very useful because the sample of 8
th graders 
clearly is a negative selection and the 10
th graders are a positive selection of all students in 8
th 
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th grade, respectively. Grade differences will thus greatly overestimate average school 
year differences. 
Let us now turn to other, subjective, quality measures. Here, the picture is rather 
mixed. Apparently, although CEEs have rather consistent effects on student performance, 
they can have quite different effects on various aspects of teacher performance, depending on 
the school type. First, achievement pressure is generally perceived to be higher in CEE-states 
than in non-CEE states; the only significant (and sizeable) difference can be found for 
Hauptschule mathematics. Teacher support is perceived to be worse in CEE states Realschule 
and Gymnasium. In Hauptschule, one gets the opposite – although insignificant – result. Here, 
the disciplinary climate is better in CEE states, whereas it tends to be worse in Gymnasium. 
According to the students' reports, instruction is significantly clearer only in German classes 
in Hauptschule. 
  <about here Table 6> 
Demands are mostly not perceived to be more excessive in CEE states. The 
differences to non-CEE states are somewhat larger in mathematics than in German classes, 
but they are either insignificant or only marginally significant. Hauptschule teachers in CEE 
states are generally more oriented towards individual achievement, that is they show interest 
in and support the progress of all students, independent of their abilities. For Gymnasium 
teachers, exactly the opposite holds. According to their students, they are less oriented 
towards individual achievement, in particular in mathematics lessons. 
Critics of central exams often claim that students are taught to the test. If that were the 
case in Germany, one would expect significantly more repetitions, in particular of exercises 
relevant for the central exam, and less innovations. We find no empirical support for such 
critique. In particular students in Hauptschule seem to benefit from more innovative exercises 
and students in Realschule report less repetitions. 
Let us now turn to the parents' view. As already mentioned, parents in CEE states are 
less likely to say that the academic level of their children's school is too low. At the same time 
they less often think that teachers exert too little effort and they are less often dissatisfied with 
the school as a whole. However, in contrast to their views on the academic level, differences 
between CEE and non-CEE states are not significant – with one exception: Parents whose 
children are in Hauptschule are significantly more satisfied with the school in CEE states. 
Overall, the students' and parents' view of teachers' behavior suggest that at least 
Hauptschule teachers in CEE-states are perceived to be better teachers. This is less clear for 
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raising the quality of teachers. In order to reconcile these findings with the strong and 
consistent student performance differential, one could argue that the subjective quality 
indicators from the student questionnaire do not capture teacher quality reliably. Subjective 
quality indicators across states with different school systems might not be as comparable as 
objective indicators like test scores. Furthermore, some of the differential in achievement is 
certainly due to incentives on students rather than teachers. 
Finally, the German states with CEEs differ quite substantially with respect to how the data 
from CEEs are used. However, in none of the German states formal rankings of schools or 
teachers exist. While in most states the school level CEE data is only known to the school 
authority and the school itself, Saxony practices an open information policy. Schools publish 
the data from the CEEs in the Internet together with information about endowment and 
profile.
11 Thus in Saxony the information for a simple ranking of schools based on exam 
results and also a ranking which controls for the socio-economic background, is available to 
the public. According to our theoretical model in Section 2, CEEs should work even better in 
Saxony than in other federal states with central exams. Unfortunately, it is not possible to 
seriously estimate this effect since only one federal state is committed to providing the school 
level information to the public and we have to confine ourselves to some informal discussion. 
Doing so, we restrict our attention to the federal states in eastern Germany that are more 
homogenous with respect to the economic situation and the traditions in schooling. The 
matching estimates suggest that compared to other students in eastern German federal states 
with CEEs, students in Saxony perform better in all school types. The difference is significant 
for students in Realschule or Gymnasium.
12 Thus there is at least some indication of better 
academic performance in Saxony, the only federal state that publishes data from CEEs on the 
school level in addition to other information and thereby allows for a comparison of schools. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The paper has made two contributions to the literature on teacher quality. First we argue 
that it is optimal to reward teachers depending on the absolute and relative academic 
achievement of students, because this raises the (unobservable) effort of teachers and 
efficiency. This is true even if the pay (in monetary terms) is not performance related. If 
                                                 
11  http://ssdb2.inf.tu-dresden.de/output/ 
12 Note that while it is very common in eastern Germany to combine Haupt- and Realschule in a middle school 
we have information in PISA-E about the school track of the students. 
  18teachers value reputation, they increase effort if the output of teaching – academic 
achievement of the students – is measured and published. Consequently, academic 
achievement of students should be tested centrally and made comparable by using a 
benchmark. The reward mechanism works best if the benchmark is chosen carefully, 
controlling for observables like the socio-economic background of the school or the students. 
Second, we used the German PISA-E data to test whether teacher quality is higher when 
academic achievement of students is evaluated according to a central standard. One 
particularity of the German schooling system is its federal structure. Some federal states test 
students centrally whereas others do not. In the German system of CEEs, the benchmarks as a 
basis for comparison are not perfect. However, the allocation of students into three school 
types reduces the heterogeneity of student background substantially, thereby improving the 
quality of the benchmark. Our matching estimates suggest that the quality of teaching tends to 
be higher in federal states with CEEs. We explain this finding by teachers’ response to non-
monetary rewards like reputation. Only in CEE states it is possible to measure and to compare 
student achievement and hence (indirectly) teachers’ effort. 
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a Some Eastern German states integrate Haupt- and Realschule in a middle school. 
 
 
Figure 1: A model of the German school system 





Table 1: Federal States with CEE by degree 
 Lower Secondary         Upper Secondary











 High school 
diploma 
(Abitur) 
Baden-Württemberg (BW)  +  +      +    + 
Bavaria (BY)  +  +      −    + 
Mecklenburg-W. Pomerania (MV)  −  +    +  −  +    +
Saarland (SA)  −  −    −  −  +    +
Saxony      +    −  +    +
Saxony-Anhalt (ST)      +    + −    + 
Thuringia (TH)      +        + −  + +
No CEEs in Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatine, and Schleswig-Holstein. Grey cells: 
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Table 2: Indicators of teacher effort 
Mathematics German  General   
# of items  alpha  # of items alpha #  of  items alpha 
Students  evaluations  of        
  achievement  pressure  3 .65 3 .58     
  teacher  support  7 .90 6 .85     
  bad  disciplinary  climate  6 .86 6 .80     
  clarity of instruction  5  .65  5  .78     
  excess  demand  4 .74 4 .74     
  individual  orientation  3 .77 3 .84     
  repetitive  exercises  2  .57      
  innovative  exercises  3  .60      
        
Parents  evaluations  of        
  school's  academic  level       1   
  teachers'  efforts       1   




Table 3: Differences in outcome variables between CEE and non-CEE states 
  Hauptschule  Realschule  Gymnasium 















Mathematics        
 achievement  pressure  0.087 1.737+  0.039 1.049 0.024 0.439 
 teacher  support  -0.015  -0.271  0.067 1.519 -0.109  -2.213* 
 bad  disciplinary  climate  -0.127  -2.156*  -0.167 -3.315**  -0.014 -0.248 
  clarity of instruction  0.001 0.025 0.081 1.872+  0.055 1.127 
 excess  demand  0.030  0.656  -0.047 -1.266 0.075  1.694+ 
 individual  orientation  0.071  1.290 0.044 1.109 -0.081  -1.792+ 
 repetitive  exercises  0.003  0.050  -0.164 -4.416**  -0.142 -3.350** 
 innovative  exercises  0.106  2.416* 0.094  2.740**  -0.024 -0.552 
 mathematics  score  0.379 6.568**  0.129 2.665**  0.156 4.600** 
        
G e r m a n         
 achievement  pressure  0.057 1.135 0.071 2.079*  0.037 0.811 
 teacher  support  0.007  0.145  -0.018 -0.415 -0.097 -2.344* 
 bad  disciplinary  climate  -0.216  -3.875**  0.034 0.814 0.037 0.793 
  clarity  -0.026 -0.510 -0.017 -0.408 0.014  0.320 
 excess  demand  0.001  0.013  -0.008 -0.214 0.059  1.689+ 
 individual  orientation  0.073  1.358  -0.030 -0.761 -0.027 -0.649 
  reading  score  0.315 6.028**  0.080 1.831+  0.045 1.463 
        
General        
  school's academic level too low  -0.138 -7.041**  -0.111 -6.130**  -0.117 -6.817** 
  teachers' exert little effort  0.013 0.838 -0.042  -2.900**  -0.036  -2.279* 
  dissatisfied with school overall  -0.035 -1.255 -0.063 -2.628**  -0.048 -2.036* 
+ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01, t-values adjusted for clustering. 
 
 
  24 
Table 4: Description of covariates (prior to matching). 
  Hauptschule Realschule Gymnasium 
 Mean  Non-
CEE 
Mean CEE  Mean Non-
CEE 
Mean CEE  Mean Non-
CEE 
Mean CEE 
Boy  0.538 0.579 0.476 0.475 0.456 0.420 
        
Age  15.374 15.309 15.373 15.355 15.371 15.351 
        
G r a d e         
 8
th  0.319 0.216 0.133 0.114 0.058 0.052 
 9
th  0.570 0.754 0.637 0.673 0.608 0.664 
 10
th  0.111 0.029 0.230 0.213 0.335 0.284 
        
Single parent  0.288  0.303 0.270 0.298 0.269 0.274 
        
Parents’  education        
  low  0.488 0.405 0.333 0.337 0.121 0.130 
 medium  0.417  0.504  0.488 0.472 0.389 0.381 
  high  0.095 0.092 0.179 0.191 0.490 0.489 
        
Books  at  home        
  0-10  0.152 0.126 0.048 0.055 0.015 0.007 
  11-50  0.290 0.285 0.203 0.222 0.069 0.081 
  51-100  0.257 0.282 0.263 0.250 0.137 0.146 
  101-250  0.164 0.174 0.249 0.255 0.249 0.265 
  251-500  0.081 0.078 0.146 0.135 0.275 0.265 
  500+  0.057 0.056 0.091 0.082 0.255 0.236 
        
Classic Literature  0.224 0.241 0.369 0.441 0.679 0.720 
        
Read  to  child        
 rarely/never  0.226  0.195 0.109 0.097 0.055 0.055 
 once/month  0.118  0.125 0.079 0.096 0.045 0.049 
  once/week  0.319 0.366 0.315 0.358 0.244 0.260 
  daily  0.392 0.357 0.518 0.463 0.665 0.646 
        
East Germany  0.029  0.153 0.042 0.533 0.083 0.379 
        
Speaks no German at home  0.282 0.216 0.127 0.063 0.100 0.046 
        
Cars per adult  0.737  0.760 0.809 0.813 0.855 0.841 
        
N (unweighted)  2,587  1,374 3,758 4,821 3,623 3,682 
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Table 5: Covariate Differences in Matched Samples 
  Hauptschule Realschule  Gymnasim 
  Control Treated t-value Control Treated t-value Control Treated t-value 
Propensity  Score  0.348 0.348 0.000 0.582 0.582 -0.000  0.516 0.516 -0.000 
           
Boy  0.593 0.579 -0.488  0.470 0.475 0.193 0.426 0.420 -0.240 
           
Age  15.297 15.309 0.748  15.353 15.355 0.171  15.344 15.351 0.608 
           
G r a d e            
  8  0.221 0.216 -0.176  0.099 0.114 0.996 0.047 0.052 0.523 
  9  0.750 0.754 0.130 0.691 0.673 -0.754  0.667 0.664 -0.132 
  10  0.029 0.029 0.059 0.210 0.213 0.160 0.286 0.284 -0.107 
           
Single  parent  0.284 0.303 0.712 0.314 0.298 -0.568  0.274 0.274 -0.008 
           
P a r e n t a l   e d u c a t i o n            
  low  0.431 0.405 -0.790  0.312 0.337 0.904 0.116 0.130 0.982 
  medium  0.479 0.504 0.732 0.483 0.472 -0.391  0.391 0.381 -0.484 
  high  0.091 0.092 0.060 0.205 0.191 -0.714  0.492 0.489 -0.139 
           
Books  at  home           
  0-10  0.111 0.126 0.902 0.055 0.055 -0.079  0.010 0.007 -0.787 
  11-50  0.261 0.285 0.950 0.212 0.222 0.505 0.066 0.081 1.240 
  51-100  0.340 0.282 -2.114*  0.263 0.250 -0.661  0.152 0.146 -0.450 
  101-250  0.163 0.174 0.488 0.253 0.255 0.141 0.274 0.265 -0.544 
  251-500  0.063 0.078 1.134 0.134 0.135 0.094 0.263 0.265 0.112 
  500+  0.063 0.056 -0.494  0.083 0.082 -0.036  0.235 0.236 0.071 
           
Classic  Literature  0.242 0.241 -0.045  0.458 0.441 -0.747  0.723 0.720 -0.176 
           
R e a d   t o   c h i l d            
  never/rarely  0.134 0.152 0.846 0.074 0.082 0.763 0.044 0.045 0.169 
  once/month  0.125 0.125 0.035 0.090 0.096 0.536 0.045 0.049 0.440 
  once/week  0.342 0.366 0.915 0.375 0.358 -0.863  0.253 0.260 0.348 
  daily  0.400 0.357 -1.562  0.460 0.463 0.106 0.658 0.646 -0.493 
           
Speaks no German at home  0.220  0.216  -0.109  0.056 0.063 0.665 0.047 0.046 -0.148 
           
East  0.152 0.153 0.011 0.533 0.533 0.000 0.379 0.379 -0.000 
           
Cars per adult  0.745  0.760  0.535  0.816 0.813 -0.137  0.844 0.841 -0.149 
           
N  (unweighted)  699  1,374  1,205  4,821  1,552  3,682  
N (weighted)  1,374  1,374    4,821  4,821  3,682  3,682  
Note – Statistics computed on the weighted sample; t-values account for multiple uses of observations. 
+ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table 6: Differences between CEE and non-CEE states, nearest neighbor matching estimates 
  Hauptschule  Realschule  Gymnasium 















Mathematics        
 achievement  pressure  0.168 2.391*  0.009 0.155 0.041 0.765 
 teacher  support  0.014  0.199  -0.030 -0.503 -0.181 -3.438** 
 bad  disciplinary  climate  -0.104 -1.436 -0.038 -0.678 0.079  1.317 
  clarity of instruction  0.047 0.656 0.053 0.967 -0.019  -0.357 
 excess  demand  0.069  1.121  -0.010 -0.242 0.078  1.671+ 
 individual  orientation  0.108  1.476 0.057 1.120 -0.107  -1.926+ 
 repetitive  exercises  0.037  0.546  -0.168 -3.568**  -0.074 -1.439 
 innovative  exercises  0.144  2.365*  0.020 0.365 -0.120  -2.211* 
 mathematics  score  0.311 4.805**  0.255 4.301**  0.164 3.493** 
        
German        
 achievement  pressure  0.059 0.942 0.054 1.166 0.004 0.082 
  teacher  support  0.081 1.276 -0.085 -1.731+  -0.123 -2.649** 
 bad  disciplinary  climate  -0.148  -2.123*  0.022 0.334 0.048 1.008 
  clarity  0.129  1.896+  -0.070 -1.302 -0.027 -0.514 
 excess  demand  -0.021  -0.309  0.010 0.226 -0.015  -0.330 
 individual  orientation  0.144  2.020* -0.042 -0.956 -0.016 -0.301 
  reading  score  0.309 4.875**  0.252 4.177**  0.160 3.485** 
        
General        
  school's academic level too low  -0.140 -4.805**  -0.097 -4.268**  -0.110 -5.624** 
  teachers' exert little effort  -0.020 -0.859 -0.000 -0.017 -0.024 -1.225 
  dissatisfied with school overall  -0.047 -2.223*  -0.010 -0.764 -0.011 -0.814 
+ p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01, t-values adjusted for clustering. 
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Table A1: Items used to generate teacher effort indices 
Student variables   
Achievement pressure  The teacher wants students to work hard. 
The teacher tells students that they can do better. 
The teacher does not like it when students deliver sloppy work. 
Teacher support  The teacher shows an interest in every student’s learning. 
The teacher gives students an opportunity to express opinions. 
The teacher helps students with their work. 
The teacher continues teaching until the students understand. 
The teacher does a lot to help students. 
The teacher helps students with their learning. 
[Mathematics only:] The teacher gives helpful advice for my work 
Bad disciplinary climate  The teacher has to wait a long time for students to quiet down. 
Students cannot work well. 
Students don’t listen to what the teacher says. 
Students don’t start working for a long time after the lesson begins. 
There is noise and disorder. 
At the start of class, more than five minutes are spent doing nothing. 
Clarity  The teacher gives clear instructions what to do 
Everything that we do is well planned 
There are specific rules that we must adhere to 
The teacher tells us at the beginning of the lesson what to do 
The teacher summarizes what was done in the previous lesson 
Excess demand  Time is too short to finish my work 
The things we do are too difficult for me 
The teacher tells us things that I do not understand 
You stop listening because you do not understand anything 
Individual orientation  Our teacher acknowledges improvements even if students are below average 
When I really make an effort, the teacher commends me even if others are still better than me 
Our teacher also commends weak students when they make improvements. 
Repetitive exercises  We make little progress because we repeat so much 
We always do the same exercises 
Innovative exercises  By some of our exercises, you can really see if you have understood the topic 
We often apply what we learn to new topics 
You have to pay close attention because the exercises are similar but always a bit different 
Parent variables   
School's academic level  How do you rate the academic level of your child's school – far too low, too low, about right, 
too high or far too high? 
Teachers' efforts  How much do teachers exert themselves for their students – not at all, a little bit, somewhat, 
much, or very much? 
Overall satisfaction with 
school 
How satisfied are you with your child's school – very dissatisfied, dissatisfied, neither 
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